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Abstract 
Do workers reward fair wages with higher job effort, better labour relations, and greater 
workplace labour productivity and profitability (positive reciprocity) and punish unfair wages 
with lower effort, worse relations, and lesser productivity and profitability (negative 
reciprocity)?  The importance of fairness and reciprocity in labour markets rests largely on 
experimental results examining the behaviour of subjects in laboratory settings.  In contrast, I 
examine whether workers, who report whether they feel that their pay is fair or unfair, 
reciprocate in their normal, everyday jobs using a large, economy-wide, Australian linked 
survey of workers and workplaces.  Without controls for pay schemes, no statistically significant 
evidence of positive reciprocity is found although I find some evidence of negative reciprocity 
in labour relations and workplace labour productivity.  I introduce controls for pay scheme to 
isolate a particular payment arrangement which would best foster reciprocity.  Under that 
particular scheme, however, no greater evidence of reciprocity is found relative to other pay 
schemes.  Overall, the evidence consistent with either positive or negative worker reciprocity is 
not strong. 
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A large body of experimental evidence finds that the standard homo economicus 
behavioural assumption of self-interested individuals sometimes predicts poorly how subjects 
behave by ignoring the notions of fairness and reciprocity.  In particular, people care about how 
fairly or generously they are treated and are willing to reciprocate or respond in a similar manner 
even if it is costly to them and yields no present nor future monetary reward.  Rewarding kind 
treatment (positive reciprocity) or punishing unkind treatment (negative reciprocity) describes 
well the choices often made by experimental subjects. 
The importance of fairness and reciprocity in labour markets rests largely on experiments 
examining the behaviour of subjects in laboratory settings.
1  Workers in these settings are paid 
to perform very straightforward, well-defined tasks (e.g., cracking walnuts) or, more commonly, 
are simply choosing a number symbolizing effort which will affect some imagined output and 
the payoffs to the “firm” and the “worker”.  How worker productivity or the effort number 
varies with the wage level, type of wage contract offered, or who determines the wage is of 
primary interest.  As Falk and Fehr [2003, p. 403] have pointed out,  
While the superior control possibilities of experiments are beyond doubt, the 
question whether the conditions implemented in the laboratory are also present in 
reality will probably always be subject to some uncertainty and debate.  This is 
one reason why lab experiments should not be viewed as substitutes but as 
complements to more traditional methods of empirical economic analysis.   
The contribution of this paper is to apply such a traditional approach by using a large, economy-
wide, Australian linked survey of workers and workplaces to examine whether employees, who 
state that they are paid fairly or not, reciprocate at the workplace.  To the best of my knowledge, 
this study is unique in examining reciprocity by workers in their normal, everyday jobs. 
The questions I address are:  Do employees who feel that they are paid fairly put greater 
effort on the job?  Do workplaces, which have a greater proportion of workers who receive a fair 
wage, have better labour relations, higher labour productivity, and greater profitability?  An 
affirmative answer provides evidence of positive reciprocity.  On the flip side, for workers who 
do not feel that they are paid fairly, do they place less effort on the job?  For workplaces which 
have a greater proportion of such workers, are there worse labour relations, lower productivity, 
and lesser profitability revealing the impact of negative reciprocity?  The reference worker or 
                                                 
1 Other evidence based on one-on-one interviews or interview surveys of employers, personnel managers, labour 
leaders, business consultants, and others suggest that fairness and reciprocity are important in explaining the 
reluctance of firms to cut nominal wages during recessions and high unemployment.  See, e.g., Bewley [1999] and 
Agell and Lundborg [1995]. 
 
1worker group are those who have neutral or indifferent  feelings about their pay, i.e., they 
neither feel that they are paid fairly nor unfairly. 
I examine the above questions first without and then controlling for the type of pay 
scheme a worker is paid under.  These controls are introduced to capture the influence of 
intentions and explicit incentives on worker reciprocity.  Pay schemes where the wage offer can 
be causally attributed to the employer and not a third party and which do not incorporate explicit 
incentives should provide the best opportunities to foster and reveal reciprocity as suggested by 
laboratory experiments. 
I establish first that workers who feel that they are paid fairly tend also to receive a high 
wage as measured by positive wage residuals from conventional wage regressions.  In addition, 
fair wage workers are more likely to feel satisfied with their job and feel positive about their 
workplace and management. 
To detect reciprocity, I examine whether self-reported worker effort and manager’s 
responses regarding workplace labour relations, labour productivity, and profitability vary 
systematically with workers’ fairness evaluation of their pay.  Without controls for pay scheme, 
no statistically significant evidence of positive reciprocity is found.  In fact, paying fair wages 
has an unexpected negative although insignificant impact on labour relations, productivity, and 
profitability.  Some evidence consistent with negative reciprocity appears.  Paying unfair wages 
has a highly significant negative impact on labour relations as well as a negative, albeit weakly 
significant, effect on workplace productivity.  
With controls for pay scheme, few statistically significant effects of fair or unfair wages 
emerge.  The pay scheme which would best reveal reciprocity given  causal attribution of wages 
to employer intentions and the absence of explicit incentives does not provide any greater 
evidence of reciprocity than other pay schemes.  Overall, the evidence consistent with either 
positive or negative worker reciprocity is not strong. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section briefly discusses some relevant 
reciprocity experiments.  Section III provides details about the Australian linked workplace-
worker survey and the main wage fairness variables.  I also present the ordered logit framework 
and discuss some estimation considerations. In order to assess whether worker opinions on the 
fairness of their pay are meaningful, I examine in Section IV whether fair wages are positively 
associated with high wages and favourable attitudes by workers toward their job, workplace, and 
management.  In Section V , different pay scheme variables are defined followed by the main 
investigation whether wage fairness leads to observable reciprocity effects.  The final section 
provides a summary and concluding remarks.  
 
2 
II.  A Brief Discussion of Some Reciprocity Experiments   
Results from ultimatum bargaining game experiments aptly demonstrate negative 
reciprocity.
2  In this game, two subjects (a proposer and a responder) must agree on how to 
divide a fixed sum of money.  The proposer makes an offer on how to share that sum which the 
responder must either accept or reject.  If the offer is accepted, the proposed division is 
implemented.  If rejected, both subjects receive nothing.  Assuming selfish preferences, the 
subgame perfect strategy has the proposer offer the smallest positive amount to the responder 
who will then accept.  A robust finding in hundreds of experimental trials is that offers of less 
than 20 percent of the amount to be shared are turned down with  probability 0.4 to 0.6 .  While 
self-interest would suggest accepting the offer (“something is better than nothing”), responders 
view offers which are too “low” as unfair and reject them.  The proposer receives no share and is 
punished. 
Positive reciprocity has been shown in gift-exchange experiments.  A proposer or 
employer offers a wage payment.  The responder or worker may either accept or reject the wage 
offer.  If rejected, both subjects earn nothing.  If accepted, the responder must choose a number 
that is an abstract representation of the level of worker effort.  The responder/worker subject 
never expends physical nor mental effort.  “Effort” here only has import due to its monetary 
consequences.  Greater effort is profitable to the employer but increasingly costly to the worker.  
Workers have no monetary incentive to select more than the minimum level of effort.  The 
above gift-exchange game presents a stylized principal-agent situation with incomplete 
contracts.  The wage offer or contract is incomplete since the proposer or principal cannot 
specify and enforce a particular effort level of the responder or agent.     
While the subgame perfect strategy would be the lowest possible wage offered and the 
lowest possible effort elicited, the main experimental findings are much higher wage offers and 
effort levels than predicted as well as a positive wage-effort relationship.  A sizeable proportion 
of responders (often 40 percent or more) reward generous or fair wage offers with generous 
effort.  This positive reciprocity leads to “cooperative” outcomes which are less Pareto-
inefficient relative to standard game theory predictions with self-interested agents.  Given the 
contractual incompleteness with regard to effort, employers may use fair wages as a strategy 
based on worker reciprocity to motivate workers and limit shirking. 
                                                 
2 Falk and Fischbacher [2002], Fehr and Gächter [2000], and Fehr and Schmidt [2001] all provide an overview of 
the experimental results documenting the importance of fairness and reciprocity as well as coverage of different 
 
3The degree of reciprocity may depend on the type of reciprocity.  Negative and positive 
reciprocity need not be symmetric.  In experiments which consider both types, there “. . . seems 
to be an emerging consensus that the propensity to punish harmful behavior is stronger than the 
propensity to reward friendly behavior” (Fehr and Gächter [2000], p. 162).       
Laboratory studies also suggest that worker reciprocity is influenced by intentions and 
explicit incentives.  The importance of intentions is linked to “intentions-based reciprocity,” one 
of the main theoretical approaches to modelling fairness and reciprocity.  This approach is 
linked to psychological game theory and assumes that agents care about the intentions that lead 
their opponents to choose their actions as well as the distributional consequences of the actions 
(see Fehr and Schmidt [2001]).  Modifying the above gift-exchange game so that workers are 
not allowed to reject the wage offer, Charness [2004] examines the effort choices of the worker 
when the offer is made by the employer or by an external process (a draw from a bingo cage or a 
choice by a neutral third party).  Causal attribution takes into account whether the choice is 
made by a party who is materially affected by the choice and suggests that reciprocity would be 
greater in the case of employer’s volition.  His experiments show significant negative reciprocity 
as low wage offers are significantly more likely to lead to minimal effort in the employer-
generated relative to the exogenous wage case.  On the other hand, no clear conclusion can be 
drawn for positive reciprocity when examining the difference in effort response to high wage 
offers across the two treatment cases.  He concludes that the attribution of volition is important 
in effort choice consistent with intentions-based reciprocity.
3
Explicit incentives tend to reduce worker reciprocity or cooperation.  In a series of 
experiments, Fehr and Gächter [2002] examine worker effort choices and resulting employer 
profits and wage payments under three treatments:  employer offers a contract consisting of a 
fixed wage and a desired effort level and two treatments where the contract is supplemented 
with either a bonus or fine.
4  If the worker is caught shirking (actual effort is less than desired), 
the worker is either fined or the bonus is not paid.  The fine and bonus act as explicit 
performance pay since they depend on the worker’s choice of effort.  They bind when the 
worker shirks subject to an exogenous probability that the shirking is verified.  Their results 
indicate that average effort levels are lower under explicit performance incentives relative to 
                                                                                                                                                             
theoretical approaches.  References for the experimental results mentioned in this Section can be found in these 
three papers. 
3 Although not in a labour market context, other experimental evidence supporting the impact of intentions on 
reciprocity can be found in Blount [1995], Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher [2000], and Offerman [2002]. 
4 Fehr and Gächter [2002] present the experiments as a buyer and seller contracting over a good or service where 
the seller can determine the quality.  Elsewhere (Fehr and Gächter [2000]), however, they re-label the buyer, seller, 
and quality as employer, worker, and effort which I follow here.    
 
4fixed wages.  The fixed wage “trust” treatment relies only on reciprocity-based effort elicitation 
which is reduced or “crowded out” when explicit incentives are introduced.
5  
 
III.  Data and Some Econometric Considerations   
A.  The 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
The data used in this paper are drawn from the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (AWIRS 95).  This survey was conducted by the Australian Commonwealth 
Department of Industrial Relations in 1995.  I use two components of AWIRS 95 and establish a 
matched workplace-employee data set.  The first component is the main survey of 2001 
Australian workplaces with at least 20 employees spanning all industry sectors except 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, and defence.  It is composed of four different questionnaires 
completed by different individuals affiliated with the workplace; in particular, an employee 
responsible for employee records, the most senior manager, the manager responsible for 
employee relations, and the most senior delegate from the largest union at the workplace, if a 
union and delegate were present.  The second component is the employee survey which 
randomly surveyed a sample of employees at each of 1896 (or 95%) of the 2001 workplaces in 
the main survey.  A total of 30,005 questionnaires were distributed resulting in  19,155 
employee observations or a response rate of 64%.  Linking these components provides detailed 
information about both the workers and their workplaces.
 6  
B.  Wage Fairness Variables 
The key variables of interest capture worker responses to this statement:   
I get paid fairly for the things I do in my job. 
Of the 18,287 useable responses, the distribution of possible answers were:  “Agree” 47.5%, 
“Neither agree nor disagree” 20.5%, and “Disagree” 32.0%.  Although almost half felt they 
received a fair wage, the fraction of employees who had a neutral opinion about the statement 
and of employees who disagree are sizable.
7   
                                                 
5 Their results indicating that performance incentives may undermine reciprocity or lower voluntary cooperation are 
consistent with other work by economists (see, e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini [2000] ) and the work by psychologists 
on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by explicit rewards (see Deci and Ryan [1985] ).  
6 Morehead et al. [1997] provides further detailed information about AWIRS 95.   
7 Note for this variable and for other attitudinal queries in the AWIRS 95 survey, respondents could respond with 
“Don’t know” but that response has been recoded as “Missing” in the data set available to this researcher.   
Generally, the “Don’t know” response constitutes a small percentage of all responses.  For example with regard to 
the paid fairly statement, the AWIRS 95 codebook reports that 447 (2.3%) of all 19,155 employee responses were 
truly “Missing” while 421 (2.1%)  were actually “Don’t know.”  The other possible responses of “Agree,” “Neither 
agree nor disagree,” or “Disagree” register a definite although possibly neutral opinion about the statement while 
“Don’t know” suggests that the respondent is unsure about their opinion.    
 
5Wage fairness is measured by the response of the worker and not of the employer or by 
some objective standard.  The inherent subjectivity is unavoidable and desirable since the 
worker’s beliefs are crucial in his/her desire to reciprocate.
8  Community surveys of fairness 
(see, e.g., Kahneman, et al. [1986]) find that while a large majority of the respondents might 
agree on the fairness or unfairness of pricing decisions in hypothetical product or labour market 
transactions, a substantial minority almost always will disagree.  Like beauty, what constitutes a 
fair wage is in the eye of the beholder.  How workers interpret being paid fairly and what 
interpersonal wage comparisons they might make is not certain (i.e., “fair” relative to what or 
whom?) nor is of primary importance to this paper.   
Using the survey responses to the above statement, I construct two dummy variables (Fair 
wage  and Unfair wage) to indicate whether the worker agreed or disagreed with the above 
statement.  To capture wage fairness at the workplace, I need to aggregate across responses by 
individual workers.  My approach is to construct two variables - one which reflects the 
proportion of workplace workers surveyed who responded that they agreed they were paid fairly 
(% fair) and the other the proportion that disagreed (% unfair).    
C.  Ordered Logit Framework 
Almost all of the all of the left-hand side variables of interest are subjective, ordered 
multinomial responses.  For example, the senior manager at the workplace is asked: 
In your opinion, how does the level of labour productivity here compare with your major 
competitors? 
with possible responses “A lot lower,” “A little lower,” “About the same,” “A little higher,” and 
“A lot higher.”  I recode the manager’s response  y  to take on the value of -2, -1, 0, +1, or +2, 
respectively.  The values themselves are not important, only the ordering.  The workhorse 
regression model will be an ordered logit framework for  y.  In particular, I assume a latent 
variable  y*  determined by  y* = xβ + ε  where  ε|x  has a logistic distribution and  x  does not 
contain a constant.  For the above productivity response case, define α1  <  α2  <  α3  <  α4  as 
unknown cut points or threshold parameters and  
y = -2    if    y*  ≤  α1  
y = -1    if    α1  <  y*  ≤  α2 
y =  0    if    α2  <  y*  ≤  α3 
y = +1   if    α3  <  y*  ≤  α4 
                                                 
8 The importance of beliefs and not simply of events on behaviour is the premise of rational-emotive behaviour 
therapy founded by Albert Ellis and is related to the Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ dictum “What disturbs people’s 
minds is not events but their judgements on events.”    
 
6y = +2   if    y*  >  α4
Estimation of  β  and the threshold parameters is by maximum likelihood.  A positive (negative)  
value of  βi  suggests that with higher values of the associated variable  xi , the distribution of  y*  
will be shifted to the right (left) and raise (lower) the probability  y  is in the highest response 
category (+2) and lower (raise) the probability in the lowest response category (-2).  The 
probability impact on the intermediate categories cannot be signed. 
The right-hand side variables consist of those used in a fairly conventional wage 
regression.  I make use of the matched worker-workplace aspect of the AWIRS 95 survey.  A 
large number of human capital variables, demographic characteristics, and job characteristics 
provide information about the worker while unionization membership and activity, workplace 
size, firm size, ownership, product market considerations, workforce composition, and 2-digit 
level industry dummy variables provide details about the workplace.
9  Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for all variables used in this study.  For consistency and simplicity, the same 
controls are relied on in the non-wage regressions.  Regressions at the worker-level incorporate 
information about both the worker and workplace while those at the workplace-level incorporate 
information about the workplace. 
Because most of the right-hand side controls are indicator variables, the ordered logit 
regressions may, in a few cases, fail to converge due to the problem of perfect prediction or 
perfect separation.  In particular, I examine in Sec. IV job effort by females where about 94% of 
female workers respond that they put “a lot of effort” into their job which is the highest response 
category.  For any given indicator right-hand side variable, there may not be any variability in 
reported job effort for workers in the sample, e.g., among females whose highest completed 
education level is primary school, all report that they put a lot of effort into their job.  Knowing 
if a female is in that education category perfectly predicts the dependent variable.  As a result, 
maximum likelihood estimation chooses a coefficient for the primary education dummy variable 
closer and closer to infinity so that the latent variable  y*  is almost certainly above the highest 
cut point.  In these perfect prediction situations, I drop both the offending indicator variable and 
associated observations (e.g., females with only a primary education).  These situations, 
however, do not arise when relying on the full AWIRS 95 sample of  workers or workplaces but 
only when using the smaller sub-samples of male workers or of female workers. 
 
                                                 
9 These controls can be found in other wage studies which use the AWIRS 95 data, see, e.g., Wooden [2001]. 
 
7IV.  Fair Wages, High Wages, and Worker Attitudes   
As discussed in Section III, my variables for fair wage are based on workers’ subjective 
responses.  The economics literature refers to norms and suggests that the fairness of how one is 
treated is by comparison to the treatment of reference individuals or of reference groups (see, 
e.g., Akerlof [1982] and Fehr and Schmidt [2001]).  I do not explore what are those norms or 
reference individuals/groups but instead assess whether workers’ survey responses are 
meaningful by assessing their correlation with wages and attitudes toward work and 
management.  In particular, I would expect that workers who report that they are paid fairly 
receive a high wage and look upon their job, workplace, and management favourably.  If 
managers seek  
A.  Are Fair Wages High Wages? 
In the gift exchange version of efficiency wages, employers may find it profitable to offer 
workers a “gift” or wage in excess what they would receive if they left their current jobs.
10  I 
capture the notion of “high wage,” i.e., a wage greater than a worker’s best alternative or the 
market-clearing wage,  by examining the residuals from a conventional wage regression.  I 
conjecture that a worker who is paid more than what would be expected given the individual’s 
measurable productivity and workplace characteristics is more likely to agree with the AWIRS 
95 survey statement that “I get paid fairly for the things I do in my job.”   
The wage regression takes the form of 
ln Wik  =  α  +  β Xik  +  γ Zk  +  eik  ,         i  =  1, . . ., Nk      k  =  1, . . . , K        (1) 
where  ln Wik  is the natural log of the wage rate for worker  i  in workplace k, Xik  is a set of 
employee characteristics, Zk  a set of workplace characteristics, Nk  the number of worker 
observations in workplace  k , and  K  the number of workplaces.  The choice and construction 
of variables (both dependent and independent) mimics what was used by Wooden [2001] who 
analyzes union wage effects in Australian labour markets using the same AWIRS 95 survey data 
as this study.  The wage rate variable is constructed by dividing the usual or average gross 
weekly earnings by the usual hours worked on the job.  The weekly earnings data is coded in 23 
pay categories.  As is conventional, actual earnings are approximated by choosing the mid-point 
of each pay category.
11
                                                 
10 In Akerlof’s [1982, p. 543] seminal paper linking gift exchange to labour markets, he writes, “Workers’ effort 
depends upon the norms determining a fair day’s work.  In order to affect those norms, firms may pay more than the 
market-clearing wage.” 
11 Following Wooden [2001], the estimate for the top open-ended pay category ($1,150 or more per week) was 
arbitrarily obtained by multiplying the lower bound of $1,150 by 1.5 .  Wooden [2001, fn. 8] indicates that his 
results are not sensitive to the method used in assigning earnings in this open range. 
 
8A large number of explanatory variables are used most of which are dummy variables.  
The vector  Xik is composed of human capital, demographic, and job characteristics of the 
worker while  Zk  is composed of workplace measures of union presence and activity, workplace 
ownership and size, firm size, product market characteristics, and gender and shiftwork 
composition of the workforce.
12   
Wage equation (1) is estimated separately by gender using fixed effects estimation for our 
workplace clustered sample.
13  I create a Get paid fairly ordinal variable taking the value of  +1, 
0, or  -1  if an employee’s response is  “Agree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” or “Disagree,” 
respectively, to the statement  I get paid fairly for the things I do in my job.   Using an ordered 
logit model, I then regress separately by gender the Get paid fairly variable on the residuals   
from estimating wage equation (1) as well as on the workplace effect   and idiosyncratic error 
 components of   ( ≡  +  ) .  Table 2 reports the results.  I find that the coefficients on 
the estimated wage residuals as well as on its components are positive and highly significant (p-
value<.01) for both males and females.  Clearly, employees who are paid more than what would 
be expected from a typical wage regression are more likely to respond that they are paid fairly.  
ik e ˆ
i c ˆ
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12 In particular,  Xik  consists of seven age group dummies, seven education dummies,  job tenure, job tenure 
squared, eight occupation dummies, two overseas region of birth dummies, three variables indicating the number of 
children in three different age categories and several dummy variables which indicate whether worker is disabled, is 
an Australian Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, is employed on a casual basis (received neither paid holiday nor 
sick leave), is employed on a fixed term contract, and is a union member.  The workplace variables  Zk  control for 
the proportion of workplace employees who belong to a union, an “active” union dummy, two size of foreign 
ownership dummies, workplace employment size and size squared, six firm size dummies, 15 industry dummies (2-
digit ANZSIC classification scheme), six dummy categories for percentage of employees who worked shifts or 
were on call, proportion of employees who are female, and several dummy variables which capture product market 
considerations.  These product market variables indicate whether there are “few” or “many” competitors for the 
workplace’s major product and whether the workplace is non-commercial, is in the public sector, exports most of its 
major product, or faces import competition.  For additional details about the controls  Xik  and  Zk , please see 
Wooden [2001].  Unlike Wooden, I do not include workplace controls for labour costs as a proportion of total costs 
nor seven variables measuring the occupational composition of the workforce.  The former was viewed as a means 
to measure labour intensity and the latter as “as a crude means of controlling for sorting behaviour by firms” (p. 10).  
The theoretical justification for either is weak, however.  I also do not include controls for workplace location since 
that AWIRS 95 information is no longer available for public use.  In one very minor difference with Wooden who 
combines the 1000-4999 employees and 5000-9999 employees categories into one, I retain all seven, rather than 
six, workplace employment size categories. 
13 For both male and female wage regressions, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test supports a random 
effects over a pooled OLS specification due to the presence of non-zero workplace effects.  The Hausman  χ²  test 
favours fixed effects rather than random effects for males and the reverse for females.  For similar wage estimation 
across gender although at the cost of lesser efficiency, I focus on the fixed effects approach for the female sample.  
Note that the wage impact of workplace invariant controls Zk  can not be separately identified from the workplace 
fixed effect. 
 
9In addition, employees at high wage workplaces  (positive  ) as well as those who receive high 
wage shocks at any workplace (positive  ) are more likely to perceive their wage as fair.
i c
ik u
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B.  Do Fair Wages Contribute to Job Satisfaction and Favourable Work Perceptions? 
If employers seek to elicit positive reciprocity, one would expect that workers would not 
only receive a fair wage but also be exposed to a positive work environment.  Several survey 
questions concerning employee attitudes about their job, their workplace, and management are 
relevant in testing this expectation.  I list below in italics the four  questions or statements and 
the distribution of useable employee responses in the AWIRS 95 sample along with the ordering 
of responses for later work.  
Are you satisfied with the following aspects of your job?. . . “Your job overall” 
“Satisfied” = +1        “Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” = 0       “Dissatisfied” = -1 
        63.4 %                                      24.5 %                                          12.1 %             N = 18,545 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?... “This is a good place to work” 
“Agree” = +1                “Neither agree nor disagree” = 0               “Disagree” = -1 
     58.7 %                                           29.5 %                                          11.8 %             N = 18,442 
Are you satisfied with the following aspects of your job?. . . “ The way management treat 
you and others here” 
“Satisfied” = +1        “Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied” = 0       “Dissatisfied” = -1 
        44.7 %                                      26.6 %                                          28.7 %             N = 18,271 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about this workplace?  
“Management at this workplace does its best to get on with employees” 
“Agree” = +1                “Neither agree nor disagree” = 0               “Disagree” = -1 
     56.7 %                                           26.6 %                                          16.7 %             N = 18,559 
Generally, most workers tend to have a positive attitude toward their employment situation 
while no more than 30% a negative attitude.   
I analyze whether these attitudes are correlated with workers’ perception of the fairness of 
their wage.  The results are reported in Table 3.  The explanatory variables of interest are the 
                                                 
14 These results are also obtained if the wage residuals are drawn from random effects as opposed to fixed effects 
estimation.   
  If the interpretation of the wage residuals as capturing unobserved worker ability differences, it is not obvious 
that one would expect a positive association between these ability differences and wage fairness responses.  
 
10dummy variables  Fair wage and Unfair wage  which indicate whether the worker agrees or 
disagrees, respectively, that he/she is paid fairly.  The excluded response from the ordered logit 
regressions is where the worker neither agrees nor disagrees.  Hence, the coefficients attached to 
the variables of interest indicate the impact on the latent variable  y*  relative to the excluded 
category of a worker who has a neutral opinion of the fairness of their pay.  The same sets of 
covariates  Xik  and  Zk  used in the earlier wage regressions are also used here which provide 
extensive controls for both the worker and workplace. 
I find that those who are paid fairly are more likely to have a positive attitude toward their 
job, workplace, and how management deals with workers while those who feel that they are not 
paid fairly a negative attitude.  “More likely” is relative to workers who state a neutral response 
to wage fairness, all else equal.  The coefficients for Fair wage are all positive and highly 
significant (p-value<0.01) while the coefficients for Unfair wage are all negative and also highly 
significant.  The former coefficients are uniformly larger in magnitude than the latter suggesting 
a bigger impact or stronger correlation of Fair wage relative to Unfair wage with favourable 
employment relations.   
The results of Tables 2 and 3 suggest that employees’ survey response evaluating the 
fairness of their pay are not spurious, idiosyncratic responses but instead are related in a   
systematic way to their wage and employment situation.  Workers who report receiving a fair 
wage tend to receive a high wage relative to what would be expected from a conventional wage 
equation.  They are also more likely to feel satisfied with their job and management relative to 
employees who feel ambivalent about the fairness of their wage.  The mirror image is observed 
for workers who report that their wage is not fair.  They tend to receive a low wage relative to 
expectations  and are less likely to feel satisfied with their employment situation.  This evidence 
is consistent with deviations from market wages influencing perceptions of wage fairness.   
Furthermore, favourable employment relations are in accord with fair wages.  In contrast to a 
compensating wage differential perspective, fair or high wages here are not compensating for a 
bad working environment but are consistent with a human resource strategy of treating 
employee stakeholders positively in both monetary and non-monetary ways.  The next section 
examines whether workers who receive fair wages reciprocate.  
 
V.  Fair Wages and Reciprocity   
As discussed in the Introduction, paying fair wages may lead to positive reciprocity by the 
worker while unfair wages negative reciprocity.  The AWIRS 95 survey provides several survey 
questions that can capture the beneficial or harmful worker response to their wage.  In particular, 
 
11I examine whether self-reported worker effort and manager’s evaluation of employee/ 
management relations, workplace labour productivity, and workplace profitability vary 
positively with fair wages and negatively with unfair wages. 
Experimental studies have detailed the importance of intentions and the crowding-out 
impact of explicit incentives on worker reciprocity.  In particular, employees are more likely to 
reciprocate when they can attribute their wage to employer volition relative to when wages have 
been set by a third party.  The wage received by workers may be fair but workers feel no need to 
reciprocate back to their employer if their employer did not determine or choose their wage.  
Financial incentives for workers can backfire by reducing reciprocity-based voluntary 
cooperation.  I account for these factors by isolating the extent of reciprocity under different 
payment arrangements. 
A.  Fair Wages, Reciprocity, and Payment Arrangements 
To capture the impact of intentions and explicit incentives, I focus on three different 
payment arrangements.  The first arrangement is award rates which were the traditional means 
of wage determination in Australia.  Award rates are set by a federal or state arbitration tribunal.  
Prior to the late 1980s, “the vast majority of Australian employees were heavily dependent on 
[these] highly prescriptive multi-employer awards determined on their behalf by third parties 
which had little or no direct association with the workplace.  The focus of these awards at the 
industry (or occupation) level served to promote a relatively high level of uniformity across 
employers.” (Wooden [2000], p. 1).  
The second arrangement is overaward pay which is pay greater than the award rate set by 
a government tribunal.  I will focus on overaward pay situations where management unilaterally 
sets as opposed to negotiates the wage and where the labour payment is not based exclusively on 
a measure of performance  (e.g., piece-rates).  The first condition restricts overawards where the 
wage is determined exclusively by the employer.  Hence, the worker can clearly attribute the 
choice of pay level to the employer and not to any other party such as the worker, a union 
bargaining representative, or a government agency.  The second condition limits any 
confounding influence of performance incentives on reciprocity. 
The third arrangement is explicit incentives where I wish to consider pay which is at least 
partly based on individual performance and where the link to performance is formalized and 
known by the worker in advance.  Piece-rates and commissions are examples of such.  The 
incentive pay schemes I rule out or attempt to rule out are broad based, performance pay 
schemes (e.g., profit sharing) and discretionary or informal schemes (e.g., “employee-of-the-
 
12month” bonus payments).  These are qualitatively different from the  compensation incentives 
used in the experimental literature to establish the crowding-out of voluntary reciprocity by 
explicit performance incentives. 
Given the experimental results on attribution and crowding-out, I would expect worker 
reciprocity to be greatest for overaward relative to award and explicit incentive pay.  Comparing 
overawards to awards, the fairness or unfairness of the pay that a worker receives is more clearly 
attributed to the employer for the former and to a federal or state industrial relations commission 
for the latter.  The dichotomy is in no way perfect since one can imagine that a worker may be 
disenchanted that the employer has decided to offer the award wage rate than to offer an 
overaward or to negotiate a collective or individual worker agreement.  To the extent, however, 
that the assignment of award pay at the workplace may be due to custom or to prohibitive 
transactions costs in negotiating enterprise- or individual-specific wages, the worker may be less 
likely to assign credit or blame for the wage level to the employer.  Comparing overawards to 
explicit incentives, the latter is directly tied to performance and how it is linked to performance 
is not necessarily determined unilaterally by the employer but could be negotiated.  From both 
the perspective of material incentives crowding-out voluntary cooperation and of lesser 
employer attribution, reciprocity under explicit incentives should be smaller.   
The AWIRS 95 main survey questionnaire of the employment relations manager asks 
numerous questions about the payment systems operating at the workplace.  I use the responses 
to these questions as well as employee survey responses to best approximate the desired award, 
overaward, and explicit incentive pay schemes described above.  These schemes are intended to 
take seriously or account for the attribution and crowding-out reciprocity results of experimental 
studies.   
For data reasons but still trying to capture the same notion, I define or construct the pay 
scheme variables differently depending on the unit of observation (worker or workplace).  I 
define an award employee as someone who:  1) did not receive bonuses nor incentives related to 
job performance over the last 12 months and 2) worked at workplace where most workers of the 
same occupation as the employee had their pay and employment conditions determined by an 
award rate.  An award workplace is a workplace where 60% or more of the employees had their 
pay and employment conditions determined either by state awards or by federal awards.
15
                                                 
15 The award workplace indicator variable is based on a AWIRS 95 “derived variable” which the survey team 
constructed from responses to various survey questions.  As defined above, most award employees or most 
employees at award workplaces will have received an award wage rate but not necessarily all.  Ideally, I would like 
to target only those who receive an award wage but unfortunately the AWIRS 95 survey does not allow me to pin 
down award employees or workplaces more precisely. 
 
13An  overaward employee is defined to be someone who worked at an overaward 
workplace.  An overaward workplace is a workplace where:  1) all employees at the workplace 
receive overaward pay, 2) overaward payments are not based only on a measure of performance, 
and 3) overawards are not negotiated but are set by management.  An explicit incentive 
employee is defined to be a non-managerial worker at an explicit incentive workplace.  An 
explicit incentive workplace is a workplace where:  1) all non-managerial employees received 
performance-related pay in the last year
16, 2) performance-related payments are based at least 
partly on individual performance
17, and 3) all non-managerial employees know the criteria used 
in assessing their performance-related pay.  The above pay scheme variables (award, 
overaward, and explicit incentives) whether at the employee or workplace level are constructed 
as indicator variables.  A fourth pay scheme (other) is created simply as the residual category for 
employees or for workplaces which do not fit into any of the other three schemes.  The four 
payment system variables are designed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
18  Table 4 
provides details of the distribution of employees and workplaces in the survey sample across the 
different payment schemes.
19    
B.  Template for Estimating Reciprocity Equations 
Worker reciprocity will be examined using four different ordinal dependent variables – 
one of which is at the worker level (employee effort) and the other three at the workplace level 
                                                 
16 The restriction to non-managerial employees is due only to the design of the AWIRS 95 survey questions on 
performance pay which asked about those payments only for non-managerial workers at the workplace.  
17 The survey question which inquired on the basis of the performance payments used at the workplace allowed the 
employee relations manager to respond with individual performance, workgroup performance, workplace 
performance, profit sharing, organisation performance as a whole, some other criterion, or any combination of these 
possibilities.  Of the 722 workplaces who reported using performance payments, the vast majority (74.8%) 
indicated that they were based at least partly on individual performance.  Of course, while individual performance 
pay may have been used at the workplace, not all employees at that workplace may have received individual 
performance pay.  
18 Due to wording of the AWIRS 95 survey questions and my classification criteria for the award, overaward, and 
explicit incentives payment schemes, employees and workplaces may be classified under more than one scheme.  
This happens, however, in 1% or less of the sample.  In these cases, I reclassify the observations under the scheme 
that is most appropriate. 
19 Before discussing the empirical results of reciprocity and payment arrangements, the reader may be interested in 
whether the distribution of fair wage responses differ across payment method.  I explore this by regressing the 
employee variable Get paid fairly of Sec. III.A. on indicator variables for the different payment arrangements using 
an ordinal logit model.  This framework is estimated separately by gender although qualitatively the results are the 
same.  I find that the coefficient estimates  β(overaward) > β(award) and the difference is highly significant (p-
value<.01).  This result suggests that workers who receive an overaward relative to those who receive an award 
wage rate are more likely to feel that they are paid fairly which is not surprising since, as the name suggests, 
overawards pay more than the applicable award rate.  I also find that the estimates  β(explicit incentives) > β(award) 
and this difference is also highly significant (p-value<.01).  I had no strong prior on any difference between 
performance pay versus time pay.  The former relative to the latter has the advantage, from a fairness perspective, 
of automatically adjusting compensation to a worker’s ability and effort but at the disadvantage of possible 
subjective performance evaluation which might be manipulated by the employer (see Predergast [1999] ).  Finally, I 
find that the estimates  β(overaward) > β(explicit incentives) but the difference is not statistically significant.   
 
14(manager’s evaluation of employee/management relationship, workplace labour productivity, 
and workplace profitability).  Reciprocity, both positive and negative, will be examined first 
without any controls for payment scheme and then with such controls to focus on more fine-
tuned considerations of attribution and crowding-out.  Regression analysis will be carried out 
using the ordinal logit framework. 
With the worker-level regressions, the estimating equations take the form of  
                  y* ik  =  α  +  δF Fair wageik  +  δU Unfair wageik  +  β Xik  +  γ Zk  +  eik              (2a) 
or  
    y*ik  =  α  +  θOv OverawardEEk  +  θEi Explicit IncentivesEEik  +  θOt OtherEEik
                +  δFOv Fair wageik • OverawardEEk  +  δFEi Fair wageik • Explicit IncentivesEEik   
       +  δFAw Fair wageik • AwardEEik  +  δFOt Fair wageik • OtherEEik   
       +  δUOv Unfair wageik • OverawardEEk +  δUEi Unfair wageik • Explicit IncentivesEEik  
       +  δUAw Unfair wageik • AwardEEik +  δUOt Unfair wageik • OtherEEik  
       +  β Xik  +  γ Zk  +  eik                                                                                               (2b) 
with coefficient subscripts  “F”  for Fair,  “U”  for Unfair,  “Ov”  for Overaward,  “Ei”  for 
Explicit Incentives,  “Aw”  for Award, and  “Ot”  for Other  and the variable subscripts index 
worker  i  and workplace  k  and the variables Xik  and  Zk  are the same as those used in wage 
equation (1).  Equation (2b) differs from (2a) by including controls for payment scheme as well 
as these controls interacted with the Fair wage and Unfair wage, variables which indicate if the 
employee agrees or disagrees, respectively, that he/she is paid fairly. 
    The workplace-level regressions take a similar form 
                       y*k  =  α  +  δF % fairk  +  δU % unfairk  +  γ Zk  +  ek                              (3a) 
or  
         y*k  =  α  +  θOv OverawardWPk  +  θEi Explicit IncentivesWPk  +  θOt OtherWPk
           +  δFOv % fairk • OverawardWPk  +  δFEi % fairk • Explicit IncentivesWPk  
           +  δFAw % fairk • AwardWPk  +  δFOt % fairk • OtherWPk   
           +  δUOv % unfairk • OverawardWPk  +  δUEi % unfairk • Explicit IncentivesWPk  
           +  δUAw % unfairk • AwardWPk   +  δUOt % unfairk • OtherWPk  
           +  γ Zk  +  eik                                                                                                          (3b) 
except the worker index is dropped along with worker-specific variables  Xik  .   In addition, the 
wage fairness variables indicate the proportion of workers at the workplace who agreed that they 
were paid fairly or the proportion that disagreed.     
The pay scheme variables include a suffix, either EE for employee or WP for workplace, 
to indicate that the variables do depend on the unit of observation.  The excluded pay category is 
 
15Award .  The excluded wage fairness category depends on the unit of observation and is either  
those who neither agree nor disagree that they are paid fairly or those who feel that way as a 
proportion of workers surveyed at the workplace. 
Equations (2) and (3) are proposed as means to detect reciprocity.  None of these 
equations are structural.  For example, I do not model the choice of payment scheme at the 
workplace.   This choice will undoubtedly depend in part on the proportion of workers at the 
workplace who behave reciprocally as opposed to those who pursue pure self-interest with little 
concern for fairness.
20  Furthermore, overaward compensation rather than award or explicit 
incentives will best foster the reciprocity benefits given the earlier discussion on intentions and 
crowding-out. 
It is in no way obvious, given the available survey data, how to model or control for the 
selection by employers of offering a fair or unfair wage and of the choice of payment scheme.  
Hence, I do not interpret the  δ  coefficients as structural or deep behavioural parameters 
revealing the magnitude of reciprocity for the population of Australian workers.  These 
coefficients simply indicate reciprocal behaviour conditioned on or given the AWIRS 95 sample 
of workers under each payment scheme and their perceptions of wage fairness.   
Nevertheless, the sign of those coefficients should reveal the existence of any reciprocity.   
The fair wage parameters  δF  and  δF**  should be positive indicating positive reciprocity while 
the unfair wage parameters  δU   and  δU**   negative consistent with negative reciprocity.  Given 
the discussion above about employer choice of payment schemes, reciprocity should be most 
evident with overaward compensation.  
C.  Do Fair Wages Lead to Greater Job Effort by Workers? 
In laboratory studies such as the gift-exchange experiments examining whether workers 
work harder in response to a fair wage, subjects generally do not expend actual effort but instead 
choose a number that represents effort which has a positive monetary cost impact for the subject 
(see, e.g., Gächter and Falk [2002]).  More recently to add greater realism, studies have pursued 
“real effort” experiments where employees have to complete tasks such as cracking walnuts 
(Fahr and Irlenbusch [2000]) or solving mazes on a computer monitor (Gneezy [2004]).  In 
contrast, I examine worker effort on their regular job as opposed to a hypothetical or narrowly 
defined temporary task.  I use the self-reported responses (variable Job effort) to the following 
                                                 
20 Several experimental studies find that in one-shot situations about 40 to 66 percent of subjects exhibit reciprocal 
choices while 20 to 30 percent do not reciprocate but act completely selfishly (Fehr and Gächter [2000], p. 162).  In 
multi-stage situations where agents have reward/punishment opportunities, however, employers or workers with 
 
16AWIRS 95 survey question restricted to those who have autonomy or discretion in how or in 
how hard they perform their job.
21
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? . . . 
“I put a lot of effort into my job”  
                        “Agree” = +1    “Neither agree nor disagree” = 0   “Disagree” = -1         Total  
All Employees*    92.3 %                              6.4 %                              1.3 %            N = 10,306 
    Male*                90.8 %                                 7.6 %                              1.6 %            N =   5,671  
    Females*           94.1 %                                 4.9 %                              1.0 %            N =   4,610 
*restricted to those who report having a lot of influence or input in how they do their work and/or in the pace at 
which they do their job  
Notice that the overwhelming majority of all employees (over 92%) report expending a lot 
of effort on the job while about 1% do not.  In addition, females relative to males, are more 
likely to report putting higher job effort.  This high evaluation of worker-reported effort with 
little variability is found in other surveys and is not simply an artefact of allowing just three 
possible responses.
22  For example, mean self-reported job effort for 213 women in the 1986 
Eugene-Springfield Labor Survey was 9.3 out of a 1 to 11 scale with a standard deviation of 1.6.  
Only 14% report a job effort level less than 8 while nearly a third (31%) report the highest level 
of 11 (Stratton [2001], p. 71).   
Since my effort measure is self-reported, I check whether the responses have a sensible 
impact on wages.  I do so by re-estimating the earlier wage equation (1) by gender but now 
supplementing the right-hand side control variables with indicator variables for the effort 
statement response “Neither agree nor disagree” and for the response “Disagree”.  Relative to 
the excluded category “Agree”, these indicator variables should have a negative wage impact 
assuming that lesser effort leads to lower labour productivity and thus lower compensation.  The 
estimated coefficients generally have the wrong (i.e., positive) sign but are statistically 
insignificant.  One notable exception, however, is that women who disagree that they put a lot of  
                                                                                                                                                             
selfish motivations may act differently,e.g., behave cooperatively, when they expect others to behave in a reciprocal 
manner (see Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger [1997]).  
21 AWIRS 95 asked separately, “In general, how much influence or input do you have about the following? . . . 
How you do your work. . . The pace at which you do your job . . .”  Possible responses could be “A lot,” “ Some,” 
“A little,” or “None.”  The majority of respondents choose “A lot” for either or both statements.  I focus on this sub-
sample to isolate workers who had discretion in their job effort rather than those who may be monitored closely and 
are compelled to work hard.  Interestingly, those who had this discretion at work are more likely to report greater 
effort in their job relative to other workers.   
22 See Stratton [2001] (pp. 70-71) for summary statistics of reported job effort for women in the 1977 Quality of 
Employment Survey and 1986 Eugene-Springfield Labor Survey.  
 
17effort in their job, relative to those who agree, receive a 13.3 % wage premium, all else equal, 
which is highly significant (p-value<.01).  This premium drops to 6.3 % and loses its statistical 
significance if the estimation sample is restricted only to females who have discretion in how or 
how hard they do their job.  The generally incorrect signs and the surprising 13.3 % wage 
premium for women workers who are slack in work effort lead to concern over the objective 
accuracy of this self-reported effort measure. 
Receiving fair or unfair wages has little impact on worker effort.  The empirical results for 
male and female employees are found on Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  Examining the male 
results first, evidence of reciprocity is sparse and inconsistent.  Without controlling for pay 
scheme (see col. 1 and 2),  Fair wage has a positive impact which suggests positive reciprocity 
but is statistically insignificant.  The coefficient  δU  f o r  Unfair wage, however, has an 
unexpected positive sign which is incompatible with negative reciprocity and, once additional 
controls are added, even weakly significant (p-value<.061).   
Column 4 in Table 5 reports the results with controls for payment scheme interacted with 
the wage fairness indicators together with additional explanatory variables.  No statistically 
significant positive reciprocity effects are found.  The coefficient  δU**  for Unfair wage now 
interacted with the pay scheme variables has the incorrect positive sign except when interacted 
with Explicit Incentives which is negative and weakly significant (p-value<.074).  The negative 
sign indicates that, among performance pay workers, those who feel they are not paid fairly are 
less likely to put a lot of effort in their job relative to those who have a neutral opinion on their 
pay.  While Explicit incentives is the lone case which exhibits negative reciprocity, it is also the 
only pay scheme when interacted with Fair wage which has a negative coefficient albeit 
insignificant statistically.  This negative sign is not compatible with any reciprocity 
interpretation. 
The results for females in Table 6 show even less support for reciprocity.  Once other 
controls are added to the regression equations, any statistically significant coefficients for the 
Fair wage and Unfair wage variables, alone or when interacted with pay scheme, lose their 
significance.  Generally, the Unfair wage coefficient has the wrong (i.e., positive) sign.  As in 
the case of males, females who receive an overaward, which is the pay scheme most likely to 
foster reciprocity, show little evidence of reciprocating in their job effort and indeed some 
evidence to the contrary.  As footnoted in Table 6, all females in the regression sample who 
received an Unfair wage under an Overaward reported putting a lot of effort in their job.  Not 
one reciprocated with a lesser amount of effort. 
 
18Since the sample is restricted to workers who have discretion in how or how hard they 
work, why workers who are paid unfairly yet still put in a lot of work effort is very puzzling 
from a reciprocity perspective.  Cognitive dissonance, which has been used elsewhere in the 
economics literature (see, e.g., Akerlof and Dickens [1982]), may perhaps solve the puzzle.  
Suppose that a worker’s attitude or belief about pay is that his/her pay is unfair.  Further suppose 
that the worker’s actual, as opposed to reported, level of effort is quite low due to negative 
reciprocity.  Note that the AWIRS 95 employee survey question on pay fairness is followed 
shortly thereafter by the survey question on job effort.  To justify to oneself as well as to others 
(e.g., the surveyor) the “unfair” belief about pay, the worker reports a belief that he/she exerts a 
great deal of job effort.  This discussion reinforces the earlier caution of relying on the self-
reported responses on worker effort. 
D.  Do Fair Wages Lead to Better Workplace Labour Relations? 
Reciprocity by workers might be revealed not only in the amount of work effort but in 
their working relationship with management.  How happy or unhappy workers are with their pay 
may influence whether they are supportive or antagonistic, respectively, in dealing with   
management.  Here I rely on the AWIRS 95 survey question of the most senior manager at the 
workplace which asks  
How would you rate the relationship between employees and management  
at this workplace? 
“Very good” = +2  “Good” = +1  “Neither good nor poor” = 0  “Poor” = -1  “Very poor” = -2 
            36.3%               53.2%                            8.7%                         1.8%                  0.2% 
N = 2000 responses 
The above responses form the variable Labour relations.  Notice that almost 90% of the 
workplaces have favourable while only 2% unfavourable labour relations. 
The percentage of workers at the workplace who receive fair or unfair wages has some 
impact on labour relations.  Without controls for pay scheme, there is no evidence of positive 
reciprocity (see Table 7, col. (1) and (2) ).  Support for negative reciprocity in workplace 
relations, however, is found in the strongly significant, negative coefficients for % unfair.  
Controlling for pay scheme as well as other workplace covariates, I generally find that the 
estimates for δF**  to be positive and for δU**  to be negative which are the correct signs for 
positive and negative reciprocity, respectively (see Table 7, col. (4) ).  The only statistically 
significant coefficients are for  δFOv (p-value<0.04) and for  δUOt  (p-value<0.003).  The former 
 
19implies that the greater the proportion of workers who feel that their Overaward wage is fair 
increases the likelihood of more favourable labour relations.  The latter indicates that the larger 
the proportion of workers who feel their Other wage is unfair decreases that likelihood.  All in 
all, the results here focusing on the manager’s evaluation of labour relations are consistent with 
the results reported earlier that wage fairness influences workers’ evaluation of their workplace 
and management.  
E.  Do Fair Wages Lead to Higher Labour Productivity? 
Now I focus on management’s evaluation of workplace labour productivity using the most 
senior manager’s response to the survey question  
In your opinion, how does the level of labour productivity here  
compare with your major competitors? 
“A lot higher” = +2       “A little higher” = +1       “About the same” = 0      “A little lower” = -1   
            14.5%                              34.5%                              38.9%                              10.1%                   
                                                            “A lot lower” = -2    
                                                                       2.1%                                           N = 2000 responses 
If the workplace was not commercial (i.e., profit seeking), the respondent was asked to compare 
productivity to other similar workplaces.  The above responses form the variable Labour 
productivity.  Notice that this variable is a relative productivity measure with almost half (49%) 
of the managers reporting higher productivity than their major competitors and less than an 
eighth (12.2%) indicating lower productivity.  The skewed upward distribution of responses may 
very well reflect a biased optimism of managers. 
This measure of labour productivity has advantages and disadvantages relative to the 
variable Job effort used earlier where concerns over the reliability of the self-reported measure 
of worker effort were raised.  On the positive side, the Labour productivity measure is reported 
by the manager, not by the worker, which hopefully provides greater objectivity in measuring 
effort or, in this case, evaluating the productivity impact of that effort.  On the negative side, this 
variable provides not an absolute metric but a relative comparison to the major competitors of 
the workplace.  If these competitors exercise the same fair wage policy as the surveyed 
workplace (i.e., firms with identical products and competitive advantages use similar technology 
or human resource practice), then the productivity impact of reciprocity will be hard to detect 
with this variable. 
 
20Without controls for payment arrangement, there is no evidence of positive reciprocity 
and, in fact, the coefficients  δF  have the wrong, negative sign (see Table 8, cols. (1) and (2) ).  
In contrast, support for negative reciprocity is found with negative and weakly statistically 
significant coefficients  δU .  Controlling for payment scheme, the first thing to notice is that 
none of the reciprocity coefficients  δF**  and  δU**  are even weakly significant (see Table 8, 
cols. (3) and (4) ).  Generally, the positive reciprocity coefficients  δF**  have the wrong, 
negative sign while the negative reciprocity coefficients  δU**  have the correct, negative sign.  
The exception in both cases pertain to reciprocity with Overaward payments.  The estimates for  
δFOv  and for δUOv  are both positive but statistically insignificant.  My overall assessment of the 
labour productivity results in Table 8 is that there is some weak evidence for negative 
reciprocity but none for positive reciprocity.  Interestingly, support for negative reciprocity is 
not found in Overaward payments which were expected to offer the best case for detecting 
reciprocity.    
F.  Do Fair Wages Raise Profitability? 
So far, the evidence of reciprocity at the workplace in response to wage fairness is not 
overwhelming.  The only statistically significant impacts can be found in Labour relations under 
certain pay schemes and with negative reciprocity in Labour productivity.  Nevertheless, 
suppose that fair and unfair wages have strong reciprocity effects on workplace productivity and 
that wage fairness is positively correlated to the wage rate as documented in Sec III.A.  Does 
offering fair wages payoff for the employer?  Are they profitable? 
  To address these questions, I use the senior workplace manager’s response to the survey 
question  
In the last financial year, did this workplace make  
a pre-tax profit, break even or make a loss? 
                              “Profit” = +1                   “Break even” = 0                “Loss” = -1 
                                   74.6 %                               9.2 %                             16.2 %        N = 1,281 
Only commercial (i.e., profit seeking) workplaces which were not an administrative office were 
asked this question.  The above responses form the variable Profitability. The high percentage of 
profitable workplaces is not surprising given that the question deals with accounting as opposed 
to economic profits.  In addition, the Australian economy was steadily expanding with annual 
GDP growth of at least 3.5% for the period framing the survey window (i.e., the 1992-93 to 
1996-97 financial years). 
 
21Offering fair or unfair wages has no statistically significant impact on workplace 
profitability.  Table 9 displays the econometric results from the ordered logit regressions.   
Without controls for pay scheme (see Table 9, cols. (1) and (2) ), the coefficient estimates for 
both  % fair  and  % unfair  are all negative which matches the earlier results found for Labour 
relations and Labour productivity .  A negative point estimate for  δF  is inconsistent with 
positive reciprocity and a greater likelihood of higher profits although a negative  δU  i s  
supportive of negative reciprocity effects on profits.  Adding controls for pay scheme does not 
greatly change the pattern of signs for the coefficient estimates (see Table 9, cols. (3) and (4) ).  
The signs of the estimates for  δF**   and  δU**  are generally negative.  Focusing only on 
Overaward workplaces, the estimates for both  δFOv   and  δUOv  are negative and do not provide 
any stronger evidence of reciprocity. 
Given the lack of any statistically significant impacts on profitability, I conclude that 
workplaces with a greater proportion of fair (unfair) wage workers are not likely to be more 
(less) profitable than other workplaces.  Even assuming that workers reciprocate in their job 
performance and in labour relations, the productivity impact is negligible and/or completely 
offset by any wage changes that might be linked to wage fairness. 
VI.  Summary and Conclusion 
The value added of this study is to examine worker reciprocity to fair wages using an 
extensive, matched survey of workers and workplaces where workers were asked whether they 
felt their pay for the work that they do was fair.  Fairness perceptions of the wage definitely 
seem to be linked to the difference between the worker’s wage and what would be expected 
from a conventional wage regression.  In addition, workers who report that they are paid fairly 
tend to look upon their job, workplace, and management favourably. 
With regard to the main topic of reciprocity, I use a variety of indicators to detect a worker 
responding positively to a fair wage or negatively to an unfair wage.  One of the indicators is at 
the worker-level (self-reported worker effort) and the others at the workplace-level (manager’s 
evaluation of workplace labour relations, labour productivity, and profitability).         
The econometric examination excludes and includes controls for pay schemes.  As best as 
possible given the available survey data, I attempt to isolate a pay scheme (overaward) where 
wages are set, not negotiated, by management and are not based exclusively on a measure of 
performance.  Given results in the experimental literature supporting intentions-based 
reciprocity and the crowding out of reciprocity by explicit incentives, the overaward scheme is 
viewed as the best setting to reveal reciprocity. 
 
22Without controls for pay scheme, I find no evidence in support of positive reciprocity.  
Employees who are paid fairly are not more likely to put greater effort in their job relative to 
those who feel that their pay is neither fair nor unfair.  Managers of workplaces with a greater 
proportion of fair wage workers do not report better labour relations, labour productivity, nor 
profitability.  In contrast, some evidence in favour of negative reciprocity is found.  Paying 
unfair wages has a negative and highly statistically significant impact on workplace relations 
and a negative, although weakly significant impact, on productivity.  Detecting negative but not 
positive reciprocity is consistent with experimental results that generally find that the former 
seems to be a stronger behavioural impulse than the latter. 
Adding controls for pay scheme yields few statistically significant effects for either fair or 
unfair wages.  More importantly, this addition fails to confirm more nuanced aspects of 
reciprocity linked to causal attribution of intentions and the crowding out of reciprocity by 
explicit performance incentives.  Reciprocity is not more apparent under overawards than other 
pay schemes.  Overall, I find no strong, statistically significant, and consistent evidence of 
positive reciprocity and only some, perhaps weak, evidence of negative reciprocity using a large 
sample of Australian workers and workplaces. 
The strong, clear picture of worker reciprocity found in the experimental literature is not 
found in my work using survey data of real employees in normal employment situations.  One 
explanation for the difference may be the superior controls available in laboratory settings.  The 
results of this study suffer from the usual endogeneity problems or challenges inherent in most 
econometric work using survey data.  In particular, I do not model nor control for the choice of 
paying fair or unfair wages nor the choice of payment scheme.  I cannot rule out the possibility 
that employers choose fair wages for workers who they know have reciprocal impulses and will 
respond with high effort.  For workers without such impulses, the employers rely on other 
devices (e.g., monitoring, performance pay) to instil high effort.  My ability to detect reciprocity 
is obscured by this possible sample selection bias. 
The failure to account for this endogeneity or selectivity is a major concern but may not 
entirely account for the difference in results here relative to laboratory studies.  The value added 
of this study is examining workers in genuine, everyday workplaces.  The external validity of 
labour market experimental results depend on whether the design and assumptions of the 
experiments capture the essential aspects that exist in reality (Falk and Fehr [2003], p. 403).   
Let me speculate where one important assumption might contribute to the difference in 
results.  Labour market reciprocity experiments generally emphasize or assume a principal-agent 
setup where labour contracts are incomplete with major limitations in verifying worker effort as 
 
23in the gift-exchange game described in Section II.  For example in Fehr, Gächter, and 
Kirchsteiger [1997], employers, by assumption, can detect shirking only  50% of the time in the 
experimental conditions or treatments which permit reciprocity.
23  In what they call the no-
reciprocity-treatment, however, “. . . contract terms [i.e., effort demanded by the employer] are 
exogenously enforced so that reciprocity cannot contribute to contract enforcement; . . .” (p. 
835).  The experimental design recognizes that if firms can observe and enforce effort, then 
worker reciprocity is not an important consideration.       
Perhaps, the laboratory setups that generate reciprocity results exaggerate the principal-
agent problem found in most, real life employment situations where the employer’s ability to 
observe and verify worker effort over time may be imperfect but not greatly so.  To be fair, I 
know of no empirical estimate than can guide experimentalists in parameterizing the degree of 
the asymmetric information problem to match reality.  Related to the observability of labour 
productivity, perhaps employers can specify effort as in Herbert Simon’s concept of the 
employment relationship where the worker accepts and obeys the authority of the employer to 
choose “the given set of tasks, performed at a particular rate of working, a particular level of 
accuracy, and so forth [emphasis mine]” (Simon [1951], p. 294).  The perspective of employees 
ceding authority to employers in the employment relationship may explain why workers, who 
complain about being “overworked and underpaid,” are restricted in their ability to negatively 
reciprocate and work less.  Maybe the employer, not worker reciprocity, largely determines the 
level of work effort. 
                                                 
23 In other experiments dealing with the crowding out of reciprocity by explicit incentives, the probability of 
detection is set even lower at  33⅓ % (see Fehr and Gächter [2002]). 
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26TABLE 1:  Summary Statistics  
 
27TABLE 2:  Wage Fairness and Wage Residuals 
Dependent variable:   Get paid fairly 
 
Explanatory Variables    Male Employees    Female Employees 
(wage  residuals)   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
          
ik e ˆ ( ≡  +  )  i c ˆ ik u ˆ  1.089*** 
(0.092) 
____   0.679*** 
(0.090) 
____ 
i c ˆ    ____  1.319*** 
(0.153) 
 ____  0.908*** 
(0.156) 
ik u ˆ    ____  0.903*** 
(0.094) 
 ____  0.570*** 
(0.091) 
          
Log-likelihood   -8487.9  -8481.5  -6791.8  -6788.9 
Model test:  χ²(1)   138.4***  141.1***    57.2***  56.9*** 
Number of employees     8304  8304    6579  6579 
          
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The Get paid fairly variable captures the employee response to the statement:  “I get 
paid fairly for the things I do in my job”  Responses coded as “Agree” = +1, “Neither 
agree nor disagree” = 0, and “Disagree” = -1 . 
2.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator 
allowing for observations to be independent across but not necessarily within workplace 
clusters. 
3.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
4.   Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
5.   Wage residuals are drawn from fixed effects estimation of wage equation (1) estimated 
separately by gender. 
 
 
28TABLE 3:  Job Satisfaction, Favourable Employment Relations, and Wage Fairness 
Notes: 
    Male Employees    Female Employees 
Explanatory 
Variables of 
Interest 
 
  
Dependent Variables 
  Satisfied
with job 
  Good 
place to 
work 
How 
management 
treats workers 
Management 
gets on with 
employees 
    Satisified
with job 
Good 
place to 
work 
How 
management 
treats workers 
Management 
gets on with 
employees 
             
              
  (1)
 
(2)  (3) (4)   (5)
 
(6)  (7) (8)
Fair wage  1.004*** 
(0.063) 
0.947*** 
(0.063) 
0.682*** 
(0.058) 
0.623*** 
(0.061) 
 
   
   
                
0.926***
(0.077) 
0.918*** 
(0.072) 
0.666*** 
(0.067) 
0.481*** 
(0.069) 
Unfair wage  -0.577*** 
(0.061) 
-0.373*** 
(0.063) 
-0.647*** 
(0.061) 
-0.440*** 
(0.064) 
 
-0.621***
(0.074) 
-0.376*** 
(0.075) 
-0.466*** 
(0.070) 
-0.405*** 
(0.075) 
Log-likelihood -6025.9  -6350.3           
                 
             
                  
-7085.0 -6717.6   -4341.0  -4680.9 -5451.2 -4945.3
Model test:  
χ²(78) 
1263.0*** 874.6*** 1218.3*** 917.7*** 699.8*** 639.9*** 707.9*** 515.7***
No. of 
employees 
7271 7229 7175 7236   5582 5574 5514 5552
 
1.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator allowing for observations to be independent across 
but not necessarily within workplace clusters. 
2.   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
3.   Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
4.   Other controls include variables  Xik  and   Zk   used in the wage regressions described in Section IV.
 
29TABLE 4:  Distribution of Employees and Workplaces Across Payment Schemes 
 
 
Payment Scheme  Employees
† Workplaces
‡
 Male Female  
      
Overaward  389 208 109 
Explicit Incentives 158 133   63 
Award  847 1246 562 
Other  4390 3097      1267 
  
Total 5784 4684 2001 
 
 
† Employees considered here are restricted to those in the AWIRS 95 survey sample who 
indicate that they have a lot of influence or input into how or how hard they do their job.  This 
restriction is imposed to match the regression sample used in the analysis of worker effort 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
‡ Workplaces considered here are all those in the AWIRS 95 survey sample population. 
 
30TABLE 5:  Job Effort and Wage Fairness – Males 
Dependent variable:   Job effort 
 
Explanatory Variables    Without Pay Scheme    With Pay Scheme 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
           
Fair wage   0.172 
(0.121) 
0.172 
(0.141) 
 ____  ____ 
Unfair wage   0.168 
(0.128) 
0.298* 
(0.160) 
 ____  ____ 
           
OverawardEE   ____  ____   0.008 
(0.422) 
0.441 
(0.485) 
Explicit IncentivesEE   ____  ____   0.797 
(0.733) 
1.559 
(1.021) 
OtherEE   ____  ____   0.170 
(0.263) 
0.333 
(0.302) 
           
Fair wage • 
OverawardEE 
 ____  ____   0.329 
(0.363) 
0.319 
(0.364) 
Fair wage •  
Explicit IncentivesEE 
 ____  ____   -0.236 
(0.636) 
-0.726 
(1.115) 
Fair wage • 
 AwardEE 
 ____  ____   0.240 
(0.282) 
0.416 
(0.348) 
Fair wage • 
 OtherEE 
 ____  ____   0.133 
(0.144) 
0.130 
(0.166) 
           
Unfair wage • 
OverawardEE 
 ____  ____   0.078 
(0.485) 
0.169 
(0.662) 
Unfair wage •  
Explicit IncentivesEE 
 ____  ____   -1.131 
(0.865) 
-2.133* 
(1.193) 
Unfair wage • 
AwardEE 
 ____  ____   0.292 
(0.296) 
0.428 
(0.362) 
Unfair wage • 
OtherEE 
 ____  ____   0.170 
(0.150) 
0.342* 
(0.184) 
           
Controls  X  and  Z   No  Yes   No  Yes 
 
  
 
31          
Log-likelihood   -1930.7 -1334.2  -1928.7 -1330.2 
Model test    χ²(2) = 
2.37 
χ²(77) = 
175.47*** 
χ²(11) = 
6.31 
χ²(86) = 
200.79*** 
Number of employees     5546  4023  5546  4023 
         
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The Job effort variable captures the employee response to the statement:  “I put a lot of 
effort into my job”.  Responses coded as “Agree” = +1, “Neither agree nor disagree” = 0, 
and “Disagree” = -1 . 
2.  I restrict the AWIRS 95 sample of male employees to those who have great discretion in 
performing their job.  In response to survey statements, they report that they have a lot of 
influence or input in “How you do your work” and/or in “The pace at which you do your 
job.” 
3.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator 
allowing for observations to be independent across but not necessarily within workplace 
clusters. 
4.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
5.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
6.  Control variables  Xik  and  Zk  are the same as those used in the wage regressions 
described in Section IV. 
 
 
                                                                                         
 
32TABLE 6:  Job Effort and Wage Fairness - Females 
Dependent variable:   Job effort 
 
Explanatory Variables    Without Pay Scheme    With Pay Scheme 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
            
Fair wage   0.349** 
(0.155) 
0.149 
(0.201) 
 ____  ____ 
Unfair wage   0.458** 
(0.188) 
0.302 
(0.237) 
 ____  ____ 
           
OverawardEE   ____  ____    0.061 
(0.505) 
-0.219 
(0.650) 
Explicit IncentivesEE   ____  ____    0.004 
(0.650) 
0.713 
(1.057) 
OtherEE   ____  ____    0.615** 
(0.274) 
0.557 
(0.381) 
           
Fair wage • 
OverawardEE 
 ____  ____    0.594 
(0.501) 
0.962 
(0.606) 
Fair wage •  
Explicit IncentivesEE 
 ____  ____    1.315 
(0.969) 
.313 
(1.272) 
Fair wage • 
 AwardEE 
 ____  ____    0.634** 
(0.268) 
0.082 
(0.359) 
Fair wage • 
 OtherEE 
 ____  ____    0.132 
(0.207) 
0.090 
(0.256) 
           
Unfair wage • 
OverawardEE 
 ____  ____    †  ‡ 
Unfair wage •  
Explicit IncentivesEE 
 ____  ____    0.357 
(0.924) 
-0.112 
(1.463) 
Unfair wage • 
AwardEE 
 ____  ____    1.061*** 
(0.355) 
0.649 
(0.466) 
Unfair wage • 
OtherEE 
 ____  ____    0.083 
(0.242) 
0.057 
(0.298) 
           
Controls  X  and  Z   No  Yes   No  Yes 
 
 
 
33          
Log-likelihood   -1108.7  -706.9  -1101.1  -700.2 
Model test    χ²(2) = 
7.01** 
χ²(76) = 
131.88*** 
χ²(10) = 
17.20* 
χ²(84) = 
138.37*** 
Number of employees    4469  3065  4415  3023 
         
 
 
† Perfect prediction problem discussed in Sec. II.C. encountered.  All 54 female observations in 
the regression sample which reported an Unfair wage and also received an Overaward had no 
variability in the effort variable.  All agreed that they put a lot of effort in their job (Job effort = 
+1).  The lack of sample variability suggests that the impact of that particular combination of 
explanatory variables in the population is large leading to a high probability of the outcome Job 
effort = +1 . 
 
‡ Perfect prediction problem discussed in Sec. II.C. encountered.  All 42 female observations in 
the regression sample which reported an Unfair wage and also received an Overaward had no 
variability in the effort variable.  All agreed that they put a lot of effort in their job (Job effort = 
+1).  The lack of sample variability suggests that the impact of that particular combination of 
explanatory variables in the population is large leading to a high probability of the outcome Job 
effort = +1 .  
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The Job effort variable captures the employee response to the statement:  “I put a lot of 
effort into my job”  Responses coded as “Agree” = +1, “Neither agree nor disagree” = 0, 
and “Disagree” = -1 . 
2.  I restrict the AWIRS 95 sample of female employees to those who have great discretion 
in performing their job.  In response to survey statements, they report that they have a lot 
of influence or input in “How you do your work” and/or in “The pace at which you do 
your job.” 
3.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator 
allowing for observations to be independent across but not necessarily within workplace 
clusters. 
4.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
5.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
6.  Control variables  Xik  and  Zk  are the same as those used in the wage regressions 
described in  Section IV. 
   
 
 
34TABLE 7:  Workplace Labour Relations and Wage Fairness 
Dependent variable:   Labour relations 
 
Explanatory Variables    Without Pay Scheme    With Pay Scheme 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
          
% fair   -0.144 
(0.279) 
-0.063 
(0.311) 
 ____  ____ 
% unfair   -1.140*** 
(0.297) 
-1.014*** 
(0.355) 
 ____  ____ 
          
OverawardWP   ____  ____   -0.268 
(0.610) 
-0.319 
(0.643) 
Explicit IncentivesWP   ____  ____  1.488 
(1.502) 
1.193 
(1.490) 
OtherWP   ____  ____   0.976** 
(0.464) 
1.214** 
(0.500) 
          
% fair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   1.099* 
(0.613) 
1.404** 
(0.685) 
% fair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   -0.162 
(1.868) 
0.517 
(1.891) 
% fair • AwardWP   ____  ____   0.945** 
(0.470) 
0.764 
(0.505) 
% fair • OtherWP   ____  ____   -0.621* 
(0.377) 
-0.426 
(0.409) 
          
% unfair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   -0.409 
(0.910) 
-0.843 
(0.953) 
% unfair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   -3.144 
(2.274) 
-2.344 
(2.310) 
% unfair • AwardWP   ____  ____  0.081 
(0.490) 
0.318 
(0.555) 
% unfair • OtherWP   ____  ____   -1.526*** 
(0.407) 
-1.353*** 
(0.458) 
          
Controls  Z   No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
 
 
35          
Log-likelihood   -1824.4 -1454.3  -1669.6 -1435.7 
Model test    χ²(2) = 
24.56*** 
χ²(42) = 
249.75*** 
χ²(11) = 
35.94*** 
χ²(51) = 
257.75*** 
Number of 
workplaces  
 1825  1562  1670  1544 
         
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The  Labour relations variable captures the response of the most senior workplace 
manager to the question:  “How would you rate the relationship between employees and 
management at this workplace?”  Responses coded as “Very good” = +2, “Good” = +1, 
“Neither good nor poor” = 0, “Poor” = -1, and “Very poor” = -2 . 
2.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator. 
3.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
4.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
5.  Control variables  Zk same as those used in the wage regressions described in Section IV. 
 
 
36TABLE 8:  Workplace Labour Productivity and Wage Fairness 
Dependent variable:   Labour productivity 
 
Explanatory Variables    Without Pay Scheme    With Pay Scheme 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
           
% fair   -0.143 
(0.288) 
-0.185 
(0.322) 
 ____  ____ 
% unfair   -0.535* 
(0.301) 
-0.579* 
(0.348) 
 ____  ____ 
           
OverawardWP   ____  ____   -0.284 
(0.668) 
-0.328 
(0.678) 
Explicit IncentivesWP   ____  ____   0.342 
(1.382) 
0.499 
(1.325) 
OtherWP   ____  ____   -0.107 
(0.522) 
-0.030 
(0.533) 
           
% fair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   0.198 
(0.617) 
0.164 
(0.628) 
% fair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   -0.676 
(1.617) 
-0.647 
(1.557) 
% fair • AwardWP   ____  ____   0.060 
(0.579) 
-0.052 
(0.583) 
% fair • OtherWP   ____  ____   -0.087 
(0.367) 
-0.137 
(0.386) 
           
% unfair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   0.279 
(1.137) 
0.364 
(1.157) 
% unfair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   -0.965 
(1.926) 
-1.126 
(2.039) 
% unfair • AwardWP   ____  ____   -0.693 
(0.567) 
-0.616 
(0.576) 
% unfair • OtherWP   ____  ____   -0.359 
(0.373) 
-0.501 
(0.407) 
           
Controls  Z   No  Yes   No  Yes 
 
 
 
37          
Log-likelihood   -2216.2  -1906.1  -2034.8 -1885.7 
Model test    χ²(2) = 
4.96* 
χ²(27) = 
49.27*** 
χ²(11) = 
6.58 
χ²(36) = 
50.03* 
Number of 
workplaces  
 1660  1430  1520  1413 
         
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The  Labour productivity variable captures the most senior workplace manager’s 
response to the question:  “In your opinion, how does the level of labour productivity 
here compare with your major competitors?”  Responses coded as “A lot higher” = +2 , 
“A little higher” = +1 , “About the same” = 0 , “A little lower” = -1 , and “A lot lower” = 
-2 . 
2.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator. 
3.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
4.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
5.  Control variables  Zk  same as those used in the wage regressions described in Section IV 
except I drop the 15 industry dummies which are unnecessary here.  These controls are 
unnecessary since the workplace productivity comparison in the dependent variable is to 
other competitors presumably within the same industry. 
 
 
 
38TABLE 9:  Workplace Profitability and Wage Fairness 
Dependent variable:   Profitability 
 
Explanatory Variables    Without Pay Scheme    With Pay Scheme 
   (1)  (2)   (3)  (4) 
           
% fair   -0.600 
(0.477) 
-0.188 
(0.488) 
 ____  ____ 
% unfair   -0.563 
(0.485) 
-0.556 
(0.539) 
 ____  ____ 
           
OverawardWP   ____  ____   1.034 
(0.863) 
1.424 
(0.914) 
Explicit IncentivesWP   ____  ____   -0.092 
(2.341) 
0.325 
(2.331) 
OtherWP   ____  ____   0.031 
(0.739) 
0.356 
(0.788) 
           
% fair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   -1.090 
(0.834) 
-0.890 
(0.929) 
% fair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   -0.161 
(2.281) 
0.795 
(2.467) 
% fair • AwardWP   ____  ____   -0.714 
(0.733) 
-0.570 
(0.755) 
% fair • OtherWP   ____  ____   0.018 
(0.623) 
0.305 
(0.688) 
           
% unfair • 
OverawardWP 
 ____  ____   -1.413 
(1.475) 
-1.389 
(1.592) 
% unfair • 
Explicit IncentivesWP 
 ____  ____   6.346 
(5.942) 
4.446 
(4.458) 
% unfair • AwardWP   ____  ____   -0.471 
(0.784) 
-0.008 
(0.844) 
% unfair • OtherWP   ____  ____   -0.395 
(0.659) 
-0.469 
(0.723) 
           
Controls  Z   No  Yes   No  Yes 
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Log-likelihood   -851.8  -718.0  -779.6  -698.2 
Model test    χ²(2) = 
1.86 
χ²(41) = 
76.00*** 
χ²(11) = 
18.11* 
χ²(50) = 
94.91*** 
Number of 
workplaces  
 1156  1028  1073  1018 
         
 
 
Notes: 
1.  The Profitability variable captures the most senior workplace manager’s response to the 
question:  “In the last financial year, did this workplace make a pre-tax profit, break 
even or make a loss?”   Responses coded as “Profit” = +1 , “Break even” = 0 , “Loss” = 
-1 . 
2.  Estimation method is ordered logit regression with robust variance matrix estimator. 
3.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. 
4.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
5.  Control variables  Zk same as those used in the wage regressions described in Section IV 
except I drop the non-commercial indicator variable as well as non-commercial 
workplaces.  Non-commercial workplaces are not profit-seeking. 
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